# Evaluation of Bilateral Coordinated WASH Response at camp Kara Tepe II in Lesvos, Greece
## German Red Cross (GRC)

*May 2021*

## GRC RESPONSE

In reaction to the emergency in Lesvos, IFRC revised their Emergency Appeal MDR65003 on 8th October 2020 and published their Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) on 20th November 2020. GRC provided an in-kind contribution to the IFRC Emergency Appeal through a bilateral coordinated response model between GRC and IFRC, where GRC NHQ was in charge of organizing the deployments of experts for the GRC WASH Team and managing the procurements with local suppliers providing the financial resources. The role of the IFRC was to coordinate the GRC-led response with the Hellenic Red Cross (HRC), public authorities and WASH Cluster and to represent the RCRC Movement. The planned timeframe for this response was from October 2020 to the end of March 2021. The construction of a water pipeline is ongoing, which implies GRC presence until the end of the construction, estimated in September 2021.



### TIMETABLE



### COSTS | ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED 04.05.2021



## EVALUATION FINDINGS

| RELEVANCE & APPROPRIATENESS | EFFECTIVENESS | EFFICIENCY | COORDINATION External   Internal | | CONNECTEDNESS | ORGANISATIONAL & INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| :) | :| | :( :) | :) | :( | :) | :| |

## RECOMMENDATIONS (according to target group)

### PROJECT TEAM

Consider and include vulnerable groups since the very beginning, to fully cover the most in need | PGI must be assumed as a priority by the management and the WASH team | Improve quality of project design through a quality assurance mechanism or MEAL delegate. | Conduct cost-effectiveness studies to assess the efficiency of the response. | SMART indicators in proposal to ensure results are measurable-verifiable | Project design improved through quality assurance mechanism-MEAL delegate

### GRC MANAGEMENT

PGI as a priority by management and WASH team | Permanent team/long-term delegates for faster/better-quality results | Minimum engagement of 4 weeks | IT setup not to hamper interventions or cause delays | Communication/ information sharing between HQ and field team to be encouraged and improved | Bilateral model exclusive for a context like Greece and HRC situation. If an option for future responses, needs to be more open, and conditions, ToRs and SoPs, be set-up prior to deployment | Delegates on first missions not deployed at the beginning of intervention | Humanitarian Project Cycle to organize lessons learnt | Systematized MEAL mechanisms with clear steps, reviews, analysis and decision-making processes

### IFRC and GRC MANAGEMENT

Way of collaboration (coordinated) to be defined in advance and acknowledged by every staff. Roles/positions to be set-up | RCRC NS and delegates to better understand the models with which the RCRC Movement can operate to avoid misperceptions and preconceived schemes

### PARTNER ORGANIZATIONS

Professional Learning Network within the WASH Sector to capture good practices, lessons learned and strategies for innovation | Institutional experience and information sharing in a systematic way | Exit strategy designed at the beginning of the intervention in coordination with local partners

## − **Executive Summary**

In reaction to the emergency in Lesvos, IFRC revised their Emergency Appeal MDR65003 on 8th October 2020 and published their Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) on 20th November 2020. GRC provided an in-kind contribution to the IFRC Emergency Appeal through a bilateral coordinated response model between GRC and IFRC, where GRC NHQ was in charge of organizing the deployments of experts for the GRC WASH Team and managing the procurements with local suppliers providing the financial resources. The role of IFRC was to coordinate the GRC-led response with Hellenic Red Cross (HRC), public authorities and WASH Cluster and to represent the RCRC Movement. The timeframe for this response was from October 2020 to end of March 2021.

## OBJECTIVES

This evaluation assesses the bilateral coordinated WASH response done by the German Red Cross (GRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) in Lesvos, Greece, applied to the response as a whole, not as an addition of projects, and for the total duration of six months. People of Concern (PoC) are individuals (women, men, girls, boys) in Kara Tepe II Refugee Camp.

The primary purpose of the evaluation is to determine the **achievements of the WASH outputs**, analysing in how far the beneficiaries' actual WASH needs could be met, based on the WASH mandate of IFRC & GRC in the camp. On the other hand, it analyses in detail, under the evaluation criteria, the **"bilateral coordinated" response-model between IFRC and GRC**.

## METHODOLOGY

This evaluation has been conducted by an independent and external team of evaluators.  The evaluator team has been supported by the GRC Surge & Readiness unit at GRC Headquarters (HQ) as well as by GRC field delegates, IFRC HQ office, IFRC delegates, and staff of Hellenic Red Cross.  The methodology was approved by GRC in the inception report (March 2021).

The methodological approach is based on a systemic perspective. This means that all dimensions - structure, operation and support processes, results, and objectives- and their relationship are assessed in order to understand the logic model that GRC, explicitly or implicitly, used to respond to the needs in Kara Tepe Camp in Lesvos. Since this is an evaluation guided by final summative judgments (evaluation criteria), the applied methodology has been based on evaluation questions classified according to the nine Core Humanitarian Standards[1] (CHS).

Four **Evaluation criteria** were defined in the TOR (Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coordination), and three more were added by the evaluation team:
    05. Connectedness, as Kara Tepe camp is still open and hosting PoC after the end of GRC response.
    06. Organisational and Institutional Learning, as the response takes place within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
    07. Result-based management, for the improvement of response processes and structures.

A set of evaluation questions are established to answer each of the criteria. The evaluation criteria and questions developed have been identified (and re-defined) considering the following:

   i.   Commissioner's information needs extracted from the ToR
   ii.  Revision of the evaluation criteria and questions proposed in the ToR.
   iii. Revision of OECD/DAC and CHS core commitments criteria.
   iv.  Commissioner's information needs extracted from the initial interview carried out with GRC HQ and Greece key staff, and from the workshop conducted to present the final report. (21st May 2021)
   v.   Criteria/questions adapted from evaluators previous experience.

An **evaluation matrix** shows the evaluation questions organised by criteria and associates indicators and standards to each of them. One or more indicators answer each of the evaluation questions. The technique used to gather/collect the information needed and the instrument used for every technique (interview grid, set of questionnaires, specific documents) are also associated to the questions.

**Triangulation of information and findings** is key to provide accuracy and credibility to the evaluation findings. The following methods are used on this evaluation:

| | |
|---|---|
| ▪ **Literature and documents review** | Documentation provided by GRC and partners, related to needs, program and response planning, resource mobilisation, institutional capacities, and implementation \| Emergency context information from stakeholders (clusters, UN, government) \| Analysis of case studies in similar contexts \| Literature on humanitarian assistance and coordination mechanisms. |
| ▪ **Field observation** (based on a checklist) | Infrastructures, PWSN and PoC who received assistance |
| ▪ **Semi-structured interviews and On-line questionnaires** | IFRC / GRC staff (current and former staff) in HQ and the field \| GRC local partners \| Humanitarian stakeholders in Greece (relevant UN Agencies, INGO's, etc) \| PoC |
| ▪ **Focus Group Discussion** | PoC |

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[1] The **Core Humanitarian Standard** on Quality and Accountability (CHS) sets out Nine Commitments that organisations and individuals involved in humanitarian response can use to improve the quality and effectiveness of the assistance they provide. The CHS places communities and people affected by crisis at the centre of humanitarian action. As a core standard, the CHS describes the essential elements of principled, accountable, and high-quality humanitarian aid. The CHS is the result of a global consultation process. It draws together key elements of existing humanitarian standards and commitments.

This Executive Summary presents key Findings, Lessons Learnt and Recommendations[2].

## KEY FINDINGS and LESSONS LEARNT

| CRITERIA | GENERAL FINDINGS | CORE HUMANITARIAN STANDARD |
|---|---|---|
| 01 \| Relevance and Appropriateness (for relief) | ☺ | **CHS 1** (and 2,6,8) |
| 02 \| Effectiveness | ☺ | **CHS 2** (and 1,3) |
| 03 \| Efficiency:    Cost \| Resources | ☺ ☺ | **CHS 9** (and 6) |
| 04 \| Coordination:    External \| Internal | ☺ ☹ | **CHS 7** (and 6) |
| 05 \| Connectedness | ☺ | **CHS 3** (and 9) |
| 06 \| Organisational and Institutional Learning | ☺ | **CHS 2** |
| 07 \| Result-based management | ☹ ☹ | **CHS 7** |

Although UNICEF was leading the WaSH response in the camp, GRC/IFRC has been **recognised as main WaSH actor in Kara Tepe II (F2_01)** [3]making significant contributions to the improvement of living conditions in the camp. GRC/IFRC was perceived as a technical innovator in developing WaSH solutions and quality HP tools, especially regarding Protection, Gender, Inclusion (PGI) and Community Engagement Accountability (CEA). This strategy of merging PGI and WASH was a successful approach to the needs of PoC. However, this complimentary was not implemented since the start of the operation and took three months to include People with Special Needs (PWSN) in the WaSH services provided **(F3_01) (F4_02) (F6_02)**. Vulnerable groups were broadly defined as women, adolescents, and girls, with no detailed profile before January.

Despite this, the **aid provided has been proportionate to the needs** as the outcomes and outputs were defined according to local needs, IFRC/GRC needs assessment, EPoA 2020 and UN Humanitarian Response Plans. The objectives were achieved based on the number of people targeted and who received the service, aiming to cover the whole camp. **(F1_01)**

> *The humanitarian situation in the camp was unacceptable, so any improvement is good, even if not perfect. (May be not from a humanitarian activist perception). Specific upgrades to improve living conditions have been happening, always complying with Sphere minimum technical standards. | IFRC Staff*

**WaSH results achieved**, produced a significant change in people's living conditions. GRC & IFRC started providing basic services following Sphere standards the first three months and managed to improve these standards and provide more quality activities and services looking at IASC standards (International Accounting Standards Board). Program can be considered successful when looking at the attainment of activities (Water Trucking, Desludging, Water points, Shower facilities, network design and Hygiene Promotion (HP) activities, although there are not clear indicators to measure achievement of results. **(F4_02)**

One of the strengths of the response is the **HP component.** There are many updated materials and innovative methodologies like the Community Engagement and Accountability approach **(F7_02)**. Showers provided by GRC/IFRC had more people than expected, as the PoCs preferred those showers to the ones provided by MoG **(F8_02)**. A large proportion of women in the camps understand the showers as a safe place to gather.

> *GRC has constantly worked in the improvement of the camp. With a leading and important role in it, with a lot of public pressure to make conditions better in Kara Tepe II | EU Representative.*

GRC was doing **day-to-day field monitoring**, through each WaSH delegate. Information was collected and shared bi-weekly via Situation Reports. Planning of needs and activities was updated regularly **(F11_03)**. It was also targeting improvement of services and infrastructures, aiming to ensure quality, timely and relevant program implementation. This allowed changes in the program planning and adaptation to needs, which were possible due to extremely flexible donors (Siemens and Volkswagen) and budget, and a financial analysis tracking expenditure - activity implementation, allocation of funds and budget sections -. While this regular monitoring improved the implementation and nature of services, a **MEAL** delegate, MEAL plan or Quality Assurance Wash delegate were missing. This would have allowed a better analysis and sharing of the information. MEAL is something GRC is working to improve. **(F5_02)**

The intervention **started as an emergency response**, and though it was not an ERU deployment, it followed certain ERU patterns (roster, short deployments, emergency focus activities, etc.). After the initial months, the response moved into mid-term activities, with improved standards and quality. While this is a positive achievement, there was unclarity among staff about the mission type, some stating the response was an emergency, some others mentioning it was clearly not **(F13_03)**. The first three months had a lot of expenditure and little activity carried out, with too many human resources compared with the activities implemented. This was overcome though, the budget fully spent on time, **(F12_03)** and resources managed efficiently, considering the complicated

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[2] **Findings** organised according to the Evaluation Criteria proposed in the Evaluation Methodology can be found in Chapter three (3) of the Annexes. In Chapter four (4) of this report, **Recommendations** have been framed according to the Humanitarian Project Cycle (HPC).

[3] Key findings are marked **F1, F2, F3...** and referred to criteria **01, 02, 03...**

political and social situation in the camp, and the health situation due to COVID19. **Balance between response costs and results** achieved is reasonable analysing the number of PoC and the WaSH services they received. **(F14_03)**

There were some issues tough hampering **timely implementation**:

- External: delayed approvals from RIC and authorities in Athens (i.e. showers approval); unclear information from the Government on regards of the camp status; presence of many NGOs most of them with a non-humanitarian and a non-professional approach or knowledge of coordination processes and channels; COVID19 which put the whole field team in quarantine during two weeks between November and December, and stopped most of the activities.

- Internal: high turnover which led to loss of information; different criteria from staff which delayed technical solutions; deployment of first-mission delegates with not sufficient humanitarian knowledge, at times not agreed with the team or convenient according to the needs.

**GRC staff** mentioned the ToR for the different roles being in most cases generic **Job Descriptions**, not adapted to the response specifics. Although **turnovers** were planned to allow overlapping of delegates, on several occasions this time was not enough to allow a fluent, informed handover. **(F27_06)**

GRC was constantly looking at **innovation possibilities**: water trucking of hot water, community engagement with PoC for volunteering, (which provided not only vouchers for food but relief for them) PGI and accessible showers, etc. This delivered a good curve of learning for the whole response. The mission started as an emergency, with indicators targeting quantities and Sphere (minimum) standards. As the assignment evolved and quality was sought, indicators should have been adapted to make them **SMART** and adjust them to new activities to have a good track of the results achieved and be able to evaluate and certify the quality of the intervention and the results accomplished. **(F30_06) (F31_06)**

GRC used digital tools like Kobo Collect for information collection, monitoring and evaluation. Global information from different missions and programs is also shared within GRC staff through an **online SharePoint**. This allows reviews of previous interventions, technical solutions, and/or evaluations, which have been considered in the design and implementation of this proposal **(F25_05)**. **IT problems** hindered though, better learning and improvement from previous experiences, since problems in accessing the SharePoint made it difficult for the staff in the field to use the documents. Consolidated lessons learnt document from previous projects to support the response were neither found. **(F26_06)**.

**Feedback**, complaints-handling processes, monitoring and evaluation have been used to introduce innovation in the intervention but have not been carried out formally leading to written learning processes. Evaluation and learning were not systematised. **(F28_06)**

Programmes and policies of other organisations and authorities were considered when designing, planning, and implementing the humanitarian response **(F18_04)**. GRC developed activities that **complemented the gaps and supported other organisations** and projects. The main actors involved were: RIC, MoMA, UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, Watershed Foundation. These actors were considered as the natural way to give continuity and sustainability to the response. GRC/IFRC strengthened the practice of partner agencies through accompaniment and support **(F29_06)**. They have learned technical skills from the information provided and the solutions that GRC shared in the Working Group, and through day-to-day work. This is the case of Watershed Foundation.

**Long-term solutions** were also envisaged as a sustainable strategy. Discussions were held with the Government to design and implement water and sanitation networks to manage the water supply and sewage in a sustainable way (not possible in the six months of operation since the Government was never clear about the situation of the camp). GRC financed a study for the water network and, together with UNICEF, is recently supporting the construction of an external Water Supply Network which foresees to connect with the Public Network **(F22_05)**.

Another strategy considered as a way for sustainability was to **engage camp volunteers (F8_02)**, as they remain in the camp. It ensures the exit strategy and continuation of activities as volunteers can be hired by other NGO's to replicate activities and good practices. Most PoCs who worked as volunteers were relocated, mainly in the showers, and are collaborating with the Watershed Foundation and continuing their work in the camp **(F23_05)**.

The **handover of the activities** has been achieved satisfactorily, except for the HP component, which was only partially taken over, as only IRC was willing to, but finally decided to continue with its own HP program. **(F24_05)**

*HP was never understood, and even IRC had no comprehensive/holistic idea of WaSH. Some decided there was no need for them to be trained, but it would have been good as no one was ready to continue HP. HP training was not provided because it was clear IRC would take over, though they finally quit. | IFRC staff*

**GRC communication with HRC** was excellent and fluent. HRC was supporting GRC in different ways to facilitate the Program's implementation. However, HRC was not doing or willing to do any WaSH or Shelter related work. **(F19_04)**

**Coordination between GRC field team and HQ** was done through the Team Leader, but in several situations, administrative support provided from Berlin was not quite satisfactory, as a result of having different perspectives of the response and how this was communicated. Principal issues were IT and HR. IT problems could not be solved adequately by the external IT company hired, although GRC HQ reached out to them many times. However, the ultimate responsibility for the proper functioning of the IT lies on GRC HQ. No other alternatives were developed.

**HR management** was pointed out as something causing delays and creating concerns among the field team. This was due both to processes and communication; the first one as result of having a big number of delegates in and out, but not the requested ones timely as per response planning (HP delegates mainly) and the second one being how the management and communication of a breach of the code of conduct in December was acquainted. This happened under a complicated context where the response model was setting-up, the tasks that RCRC Movement would take over in the camp were waiting for approval by camp Management, and the Covid-19 Pandemic complicated in-person communication. However, End of Mission reports from January to March, mentioned HQ staff managing the response as supportive. According to HQ and field staff, **better communication** between HR Berlin and the field team, would have avoided most of the problems and misunderstandings. The fact of having one Focal point managing the response after December, helped communication to improve. **(F20_04)**.

Communication flows between **IFRC and GRC team** were good though sometimes diffuse, with a lack of clarity about who was doing what and how, leading in some cases to delays and duplication of efforts. The situation improved after the first three months, with more permanent staff. There was no MoU between GRC and IFRC defining the role of each organisation **(F21_04)**.

Although it started as an ERU appeal from IFRC HQ, the organizational model developed is defined as **Bilateral Coordinated Response**, since it involves support from one national society to another (*bilateral response*), but with the support and involvement of IFRC stationed in the field. This model was mainly decided between GRC and the local IFRC office in Athens. It is particular model, that can be justified because of HRC circumstances, past experiences, context, and the immediate availability of funds.
The Bilateral Coordinated Response model can be seen from different perspectives, with favourable and unfavourable aspects. The principal ones are described below:

Positive aspects of bilateral coordinated response **(F9_02)**:

– It was raised as a possibility of working with HRC in an adequate setup (given HRC background).

– GRC and IFRC worked in close collaboration from the start of the operation, improving it in the course of the mission.

– HRC has declared its satisfaction with the model and GRC's collaboration.

– It allowed GRC to have an overall control of the operation, especially related to financial, logistics and operational aspects with a holistic approach. Arguably, this could have also happened in an ERU deployment.

– The model used avoids IFRC doing local procurements, which usually slows implementation, and lets the field team negotiate contracts and procurements **(F16_03)**. As IFRC Country Office ran the operation, it made decisions smoother and gave more implementing capacities to IFRC Athens.

– The situation in the camp was complex but straightforward. Many organisations were already working in Lesvos previously, so not many new actors were needed in the intervention. GRC taking over a big part of the WaSH needs has allowed the response to be more effective, and to control and implement in a smoother way.

– It has allowed GRC to perform with a wide scope not only looking at one subsector, but with the possibility of being flexible and adapt to cover huge needs at that moment, increasing efficiency **(F15_03)**. It permitted a small-scale response, as ERU focuses on bigger interventions. However, IFRC Geneva acknowledges the possibility of the ERU model being flexible and adaptable to small interventions.

Unfavourable aspects of bilateral coordinated response **(F10_02)**:

– The choice of this response model and the way the decision was taken, has created unease and concerns among some members of the RCRC Movement (as stated by NS and staff interviewed), which generated many discussions and tension at the beginning of the operation. Some agents perceive the decision as something that has contributed to erode the trust in the ERU as a multilateral system.

– The fact of having two different people leading the response (IFRC WASH Coordinator and the GRC WASH Team leader) generated confusion among staff, especially in the first and second rotation. It was unclear what and who to report to.

– The ERU model has been used many times and has precise protocols and procedures. It has a defined and known set-up. This was not the case of the bilateral coordinated response, with imprecise GRC and IFRC roles and responsibilities.

– It was a bilateral response that was done with GRC assets (that are also used for ERU deployments). In this case, IFRC has been co-leading the response with an important role in it (coordination, strategic planning), although certain operational protocols have been unclear. Overall commitment was with staff fulfilling all IFRC protocols, but with some grey areas as security, which was a shared responsibility.

– In this model, it is difficult to incorporate GRC achievements, contribution to the RCRC Movement and other different aspects of the response into IFRC Surge systems. This process was still ongoing after the end of the mission. This model is not sufficiently standardized to administrative be properly registered in the IFRC Geneva system, as it has been remarked by representatives of IFRC HQ.

## KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

The main **Recommendations** of the Evaluation have been organised according to specific target groups to encourage and ease their future use. The Humanitarian Program Cycle[4] has been considered an adequate framework to classify and organise them.

### GRC Management

– **A permanent team should have produced faster and better-quality results**, especially on Accessibility and Protection and Gender Inclusion, with a broader coverage. It is recommended to combine ERU roster with mid/long-term delegates from the beginning of the mission. **(PP)**

– **IT setup should not hamper interventions or cause delays.** The setup should be analysed and evaluated prior to the start of the operation and deployment. IT set up and administration formats, reporting and documentation should be ready for ERUs and other short term aid interventions and staff trained accordingly. **(PP)**

– **ToRs must be adapted to specific needs of the response**, and in case field handovers are not enough or overlapping is not possible, allow online discussions and sharing of **end of mission reports**. Handovers have been too short or not very precise. This is especially relevant in the case of first mission delegates. GRC has a briefing package with plenty of information available, so HQ staff needs to get involved to ensure the transmission of quality information. **(PP)**

– Though the need to have new staff on board for the Surge roster is acknowledged as a strategic decision, **delegates on first missions should not be deployed at the beginning of an intervention**, where dealing with uncertainty, humanitarian knowledge and flexibility are a must. **(RM)**

– It is encouraged to **mainstream Gender**, especially linked to Protection and to formal MEAL processes in GRC institutional guidelines and training. **(IM)**

– **Communication and information sharing between HQ and the field team** should be encouraged and improved. Regular meetings involving the whole team, may help to bring closer ideas and positions. This is especially relevant given Covid19 circumstances. **(IS)**

– While having an online Sharing Platform is seen as a significant step ahead in the MEAL process, there is still room for improvement, especially in the evaluation and learning part and the **systematisation of the whole MEAL action**. **(IS)**

– Improve quality of project design through a quality assurance mechanism or MEAL department / delegates. **(IM)**

– No **consolidated document with a revision of all available lessons learnt** produced by GRC and partners before the intervention has been found and shared among missions. This can be considered a good practice that allows improvement and avoids past mistakes, easily incorporated into GRC programming. **(EV)** Research the feasibility of incorporating lessons learnt of the already established WASH Learning Networks by German organisations, to capture and publish good practices, lessons learned and strategies for innovation. **(EV)**

### GRC and IFRC Management

– The **bilateral coordinated model** is a well-known model, not unique to Greece. However, the bilateral coordinated model was not often used in GRC Emergency Responses. In the Greek context, past and current HRC situation made it useful. This model can be an option for future responses. Nevertheless, conditions need to be settled and defined prior to deployment, especially with budget, roles, positions and deciding who does what and when. Conditions, ToRs and SoPs, need to be set-up and broadly communicated among National Societies and staff, with a transparent relationship. **(PP)**

– It would be necessary for RCRC Movement and delegates to **better understand the models with which the RCRC Movement can operate**, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of ERU deployments, to avoid misperceptions and preconceived schemes. This will allow informed decisions for future selection of intervention models. **(PP)**

– When deployed coordinated, the **specific way in which IFRC and GRC collaborate and support each other, needs to be defined** in advance and acknowledged by every staff member. **(EV)**

– **SMART indicators should be included** in the response activities, even if they have an emergency focus, to ensure that activities and results are measurable and verifiable. This would allow a consistent Monitoring and Evaluation. **(SP)**

– **Periodically** (according to response needs) **review the identified risks and develop contingency plans**, focusing on the capacities of the local partner, coordination with the authorities and the cultural aspects of PoC. **(EV)**

– **Institutional experience and information sharing should be done in a systematic way**. This can include previous lessons learnt and recommendations of similar IFRC missions, promoting environment learning and innovation. Humanitarian Project Cycle is a good tool to organize lessons learnt after an emergency **(EV).**

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[4] **Humanitarian Program Cycle:** Preparedness (PP) | Needs Assessment and Analysis (NA) | Strategic Planning (SP) | Resource Mobilization (RM) | Implementing and Monitoring (IM) | Operational Peer Review and evaluations (EV)

### Project Team (IFRC and GRC)

- It is important to **consider and include vulnerable groups from the beginning**, to fully cover the most in need. Improvement of the system for collecting and analysing updated information that compiles disaggregated data by sex of each family unit (age, marital status, identity, orientation, disability, educational level) would improve planning and implementation. **(IM)**

- **PGI and PWSN approach** (Protection, Gender and Inclusion and People with special needs) must be assumed as a priority by the management and the WASH team. **(NA)**

- **Carry out a comprehensive Risk Reduction plan, with a Contingency plan** with prevention and mitigation measures. This is especially relevant in a Covid context and a situation where approvals to implement activities depends on Authorities. Innovation in the response was good and managed to overcome problems, but it was possible because of the flexibility of funds and implementation, not because a previous analysis of possible risks. **(NA)**

- **Conduct cost-effectiveness and/or monitoring follow-up studies** to assess the efficiency of the response. **(IM)**

- **Differentiate between emergency activities and the mid-term processes**, not only in the day-to-day work but in the programmatic approach. Program needs to have a clear set-up defining emergency activities (ERU based) and the transition to mid-term interventions. **(SP)**

- **An exit strategy should be designed at the very beginning of the intervention**, in coordination with local partners, especially in cases where the end of mission date is settled and is not possible to extend it. **(NA)**. GRC wanted to make, not only a handover of the activities, but also of the way to develop them. This is a difficult achievement, as organizations are already working with their own methodologies. To accomplish this, it is necessary to have significant previous joint work with the recipient organizations. Also, a good analysis of the cost of the inventory to be handed over would encourage agents to take over. **(COO)**

- **Define a field MEAL mechanism** (MEAL or quality assurance focus delegates) that contributes to achieving the impact of the program, with clear steps, reviews, group discussions, analysis, and decision-making processes. **(SP)**

- **Toilet situation in the camp was poor**, with nobody wanting to take over, nor having the capacities. It was not a GRC task and GRC did not want to interfere Watershed Foundation work, who was doing the management; neither at the beginning this was allowed by authorities. The open question is whether GRC should have taken part of the toilet activity (a significant percentage) or not, as they had the capacity and toilet conditions were below Humanitarian Standards, with many PoC doing open defecation. In the last two months GRC implemented one safe and clean toilet per shower space, which were extensively used, and proved the willingness of PoC to have proper toilet facilities. **(IM)**